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This paper applies the tools of institutional economics – especially those pertaining to
informational asymmetry and transaction costs - for studying the credit problems of
small farmers in India, who, in spite of a vast network of credit institutions developed
over a long period of time under government ownership and/or control, are alleged as
not getting a share of formal sector credit commensurate with their statistical
dominance. It uses data collected by the Agro-economic Research Centers and Units
under the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India from a carefully selected
sample of 700 borrower households across the country over a period of three years
(1997-1998 to 1999-2000) to provide a preliminary explanation of the various
dimensions of a credit package in terms of variation in borrower’s village, household
and other loan attributes.
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An Institutional Economics Approach to the Problems of Small
Farmer Credit in India
Section 1: Introduction
All available evidence seems to indicate that the formal rural financial system
in India is currently trapped in a vicious circle of stagnant or even declining credit-
deposit ratio and abnormally high cost of credit and default rate. While the borrowers
are confronting high interest rates, high transaction costs and other impediments to
access credit, the banks and other formal lending institutions are complaining of low
demand besides high default rates, which seem to be further restricting their credit
operations. Although credit through self-help groups (SHGs) seems to be offering a
ray of hope, such credit still constitutes a small and insignificant part of the total
credit system. Informal credit, on the other hand, in spite of reported decline in its
share of total credit as per official records, seems to be too resilient to face any serious
problem. In fact, informal credit appears to be going quite strong in several parts and
pockets of the country (see, for example, Gulati and Bathla, 2002 and NABARD,
2001)
1.
The problems of credit are even more severe for small farmers (inclusive of
marginal farmers) and other vulnerable sections (especially, the landless people) of
the rural community, who often lack marketable collateral, credit-worthy projects and
even political clout to access formal sources of credit. In spite of governmental
stipulations in the form of priority sector credit and targets therein, the formal lenders
are often not too keen to lend to the large number of borrowers belonging to the
landless and small farming communities. In this situation, not only the landless and
small farmers, but also medium and large farmers, who are not especially favored by
formal lending institutions because of government stipulations, tend to turn to
informal sources for meeting their credit needs.
Against this background, the paper has attempted to achieve two things. First,
it applies the tools of institutional economics – especially those pertaining to
informational asymmetries and transaction costs – to develop a conceptual framework
                                                
1 Datta, Sriram, Gandhi and Parhi (2003) provide a detailed account of these stylized features.3
to capture the broad features of the prevailing credit scenario in India, which can
facilitate empirical analysis. The second objective of this paper is to perform at least a
preliminary analysis of the credit package being used by Indian rural households on
the basis of a fairly large size data recently collected by the Agro-economic Research
Centers and Units under sponsorship of the Directorate of Economics and Statistics,
Ministry of Agriculture of the Government of India from across the country. By
looking upon credit as a package of services with multiple dimensions, this paper uses
at this stage only single-equation regressions to demonstrate how these various
attributes of credit are related to borrower village and household characteristics,
besides bringing out some of the interrelationships across loan attributes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the conceptual
framework together with its theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 describes the nature
and broad features of the data used for empirical analysis. Section 4 performs single-
equation regression analysis to bring out the major findings of this paper. The final
section attempts to bring out the significance of this analysis, besides pointing out the
limitations of this paper.
Section 2: Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework of this paper is summarized in Table 1, which
highlights the nature of problems a contract (including a credit contract) faces both
before (ex ante) and after (ex post facto) the contract is made. Since credit is not an
instantaneous contract like a spot market transaction, the contractual parties and
especially the lender faces both adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
2 If the
lender cannot successfully eliminate bad borrowers (‘lemons’ in this context), willful
default would rise. So, to minimize such risks, the lender would take resort to
screening. He would try to ration credit (leading to larger demand-supply gap in
credit), ask for more documents and visits from the borrower (resulting in high
borrower transaction costs), demand good (i.e., marketable) collateral, would favor
production loan over consumption loan, and may even insist on upfront interest
payments. After a credit is made, moral hazard on the part of the borrower would lead4
to the same willful default problem. So, the lender has to spend more resources on
monitoring and counseling of the borrower in order to minimize such risk of default.
Ex post facto default may also be of a different kind – namely, non-willful default
(due to asset-specificity or locking-in effect): the borrower may not be in a position to
repay the loan due to unforeseen contingencies beyond his control. The lender can
undertake monitoring and counseling function to avoid the impact of such unforeseen
contingencies, and may even grant flexibility in repayment of loan to his borrower to
absorb the impact. But as long as the impact of such unforeseen events cannot be
totally eliminated, some non-willful default is unavoidable.

























































Obviously, the above-stated problems would be more severe in most parts of
the formal sector lending institutions, especially when these institutions are publicly
owned and there is no incentive contract for the office-bearers of such institutions.
                                                                                                                                           
2 The borrower too faces adverse selection and moral hazard problems with respect to lenders. In the
absence of any data on the lender side, this paper is leaving out those problems.5
Thus, in overall terms, when the three above-stated problems (as depicted in Table 1)
are fairly widespread (as believed to be the case in India), one would expect the
demand curve for loans would move down, whereas the supply curve of credit would
move up, leading to a lower level of credit intake and a higher cost of credit (in real
terms) in equilibrium, as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: A Demand-Supply Perspective on Credit
Price of Credit
Quantity
The above-stated framework has two clear implications. First, credit has to be
a package of services, which must include such dimensions as size, possible gap
between its demand and supply, composition, transaction costs (both monetary and
non-monetary of the borrower as well as the lender), explicit interest rate, provision
for upfront interest payments, repayment schedule as well the permissible flexibilities
therein, provision for monitoring and supply of extension service by the lender etc.
Observed default rate is clearly another important (though ex post facto) feature of
credit. Obviously, these are some of the important endogenous features of a credit
package, which need to be explained if a credit contract has to be understood in
details. Thus, to appreciate credit, a system of equations determining these
endogenous variables as well as their interrelationships has to be identified and













The second point to make at this stage is that, many of the features of credit
like willful and non-willful default or willful default due to adverse selection vis-à-vis
moral hazard cannot be separated out ex post facto. This means the impacts of adverse
selection, moral hazard and asset-specificity cannot be easily separated out ex post
facto. There is yet another dimension of the problem. Under the general presumption
that medium and large farmers are in a better position as compared to the landless and
small farmers to signal their credit-worthiness to the lenders, the adverse selection
problem from a lender’s perspective would be more severe for the latter group than
for the former. The asset-specificity problem due to unforeseen contingencies can
again be assumed to be more severe for the landless and small farmers as compared to
the cases of larger farmers on the presumption that the former are exposed to more
contingent circumstances and have lesser capability to cope with such contingencies
as compared to the latter. But no such presumption can be made with respect to the
incidence of opportunism or moral hazard. It may be much higher for the larger rather
than the smaller landholding group. So, one cannot be so sure that the value of a
parameter in the credit package will be higher or lower for one group as compared to
the other. In this situation, therefore, instead of groping in the dark in the look out for
clear and testable hypotheses, we would rather like the facts as captured in our dataset
to speak for them. With this background we, therefore, try to highlight the nature and
features of the dataset being used in this paper, before we proceed to see how the
credit package differs for small farmers as compared to the same for their larger
counterparts.
Section 3: Nature and Features of the Dataset Used
The paper makes use of a fairly large size data collected by Agro-economic
Research Centers of the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Government of India from a carefully selected sample of 700-borrower
households spread over 12 states. The sample households are selected following a
multi-stage stratified random sampling process. In the first stage, two representative
villages are purposively selected from each of the selected states – one where micro
finance has made a beginning and the other where micro finance is yet to make a
mark. In the next stage, information on landholding status of each household within
these villages is collected from local panchayat bodies to facilitate drawing of a7
random sample of 25 households as per the following stratification: 5 landless
households, 5 medium and large farming households (these two groups acting as two
separate control groups), and 15 households spread between the two categories of
marginal and small farmers in the same proportion as they occur in the population of
selected villages.
3 At a later stage, while collecting detailed household data, the actual
landholding pattern of some of these households is found to be different from what is
recorded by the panchayats, resulting in slight deviation of the actual size distribution
of sample households from the one aimed at by the sampling design. Borrower side
data on borrower’s village attributes, household attributes and credit experiences has
been collected for three consecutive years: 1997-1998 to 1999-2000.  Average annual
figures for each variable are arrived at to get rid of white noise, so that the data can be
taken as representative for the three-year period of 1997-1998 to 1999-2000.  Out of
the 700 borrower households, as many as 130 are found to be not borrowing at all
during this 3-year period. Out of the 570 households with positive borrowings of loan,
505 households are found to have access to formal credit institutions, while the rest 65
have access to only informal credit. These 570 households include 121 landless
households, 184 marginal farmer households, 145 small farmer households and 120
medium and large farming households
3. Although an attempt was made to collect data
from lending institutions corresponding to these borrower households, it could not
succeed due to reluctance of lenders to share data. As a result, the dataset contains
only detailed borrower side information.
Data collected from borrower households pertain to their village
characteristics, their education and demographic characteristics, their agricultural
production characteristics, and their asset holding status and income, besides the
details of their credit experiences with respect to both formal and informal sources. As
mentioned earlier, as many as 130 households have no credit transaction during the
period under consideration. Performance of a t-test on the difference in average values
of the attributes of borrowers with and without loans (see, Appendix 1) reveals that
the households with positive loan amounts are in a significantly better-off position as
compared to those without loans in terms of their location in micro-finance villages,
proximity to pucca roads (district/state roads), bus routes and panchayat office,
                                                
3 As per Government of India stipulations, a marginal farmer holds 0-1 ha of land, whereas small
farmers hold 1-2 ha of land. Landholdings of larger size are held by medium and large farmers.8
availability of formal credit institutions, number of bovine animals per head,
percentage of upper caste population and  percentage of male literacy in their villages.
Incidence of male education, incidence of irrigated land, cropping intensity,
percentage of land under cash crops, incidence of ownership of transportation,
irrigation and other modern agricultural equipments, annual expenditure on purchased
agricultural inputs, value of agricultural production per unit of land, per head annual
income and expenditure on provisions, ownership of milch and other animals per
head, ownership and access to various intangible resources in the local economy – all
are found to be significantly higher for households with credit than those without
credit. In terms of their observed village and household characteristics, a very similar
pattern is observed for borrowers with access to formal sector credit vis-à-vis those
without. The loan characteristics too seem much more favorable to borrowers with
access to formal sector credit than those without access. This is true with respect to
the total size of loan, % share of production loan, demand-supply gap in delivery of
loan, interest cost, flexibility in loan repayment, incidence of lender’s monitoring and
extension service, default rate on loans, use of tangible collateral and relative comfort
and recommendation indices. The former group definitely bears significantly higher
monetary and non-monetary transaction costs (the latter measured in terms of number
of days of delay between application for and approval of loans)(see, Appendix 2).
Table 2 displays the loan as well as loanee portfolio of all major sources of credit
across borrowers of different landholding size. It displays the following pattern:
-  About 81% and 58% of borrower households have accessed formal and
informal sources of credit, respectively, to claim respectively 71% and 29% of
credit shares
4 (last column of Table 2).
-  In terms of numbers, local informal lenders have maximum clientele group
among the borrowers (58%), followed by cooperatives (52%), commercial
banks (34%) and SHGs (21%). The corresponding loan shares of these four
major sources are 29%, 35%, 32% and 4%, respectively. Obviously, average
loan size per borrower is the largest for commercial bank group, moderate for
cooperative group and relatively small for informal lenders and SHGs.
                                                
4 Total percentage of households accessing the two broad sources of credit is 139%, thus meaning that
about 39% of households have accessed both sources.9
-  When the overall performance of lending institutions (i.e., the last column) is
compared to their performance vis-à-vis the four size groups of borrowers (i.e.,
the preceding columns), one can see the nature of their concentration in the
portfolio of borrowers. The commercial bank group, as expected, has a bias in
lending in favor of the two largest size groups of borrowers. This bias persists
even in terms loan shares.
-  The loan portfolio of cooperative group of lenders has a strong bias in favor of
the two largest land holding groups of borrowers and also a mild bias in favor
of marginal farmers, in terms of numbers. In terms of loan shares, this
favorable bias of the cooperative group persists for marginal and small
farmers, but not with respect to the largest size group of borrowers. The
landless group of borrowers is clearly discriminated against by cooperatives in
terms of both percentage share of customers and percentage share of funds.
-  Local informal lenders seem to be concentrating more on the landless group in
terms of both loanees entertained and loan share allocation.
-  SHGs (fourth row) seem to be emphasizing more on landless and marginal
farmer groups than others in terms of their loanee and loan portfolios.
-  Even though there are clear biases in loanee and loan portfolios of the four
major lending institutions in the countryside, these organizations are
nevertheless lending to all borrower groups. Among these lenders, however,
the SHGs seem to have a sharper focus in their loan portfolio as compared to
others.
With this brief description about the dataset being used in this paper and its
broad features, we shall now turn to see how the multifarious dimensions of the credit
package being used by the sample borrowers vary in response to their various
attributes. More precisely, the main objective of statistical analysis below is to see
whether and in which respects the credit package being used by landless and small
farming households is different from the same for households belonging to the larger
landholding group.10
Table 2:  % Shares of Various Lending Institutions in Total Value of all
Loans to Sample Borrowers across Borrower’s Landholding Status
Borrower’s land holding status






























































































Note: Figures in parentheses in first four columns represent percentages of borrowers under each loan source
(they add up to 100), whereas the same in the last column represent percentage of all borrowers (i.e. n = 570).
Traditional informal lenders include friends, relatives, shops & local moneylenders, while total informal also
includes chit funds. Total formal, on the other hand, includes the rest, which are under statutory control of one
type or the other.
Section 4: Empirical Results
An attempt is made in this section to explain the multifarious dimensions of a
credit package mainly in terms of village and family characteristics of borrower
households. The dimensions identified for present analysis include the total size of
loan received (TLOAN), its composition – especially its broad source-wise and
purpose-wise break-up (namely, % of loan received from the formal sector, PCFOR,
and % of loan received for consumption purpose, PCCONS), the extent (%) of
shortfall between credit demand and credit supply (GAP), borrower’s monetary and
non-monetary transaction costs (various expenses incurred to get a loan as % of the
total size of the loan, PTC, and the average time gap in days between the time point a
loan is applied for and the time point when a loan is approved, DY, which is used as a
proxy for the non-monetary costs incurred by a borrower to get a loan), average
annual interest rate charged on formal, informal and both types of credit taken
together (FORINT, NFORINT and INT, respectively), whether interest is charged
upfront or not (UP, which is a 0-1 type binary variable), whether the lender monitors11
and counsels the borrower after a loan is made (MONIT, another 0-1 type binary
variable), whether terms and conditions of loan allows for flexibility clauses to
facilitate repayment in cases of unforeseen contingencies (FLX, a variable constructed
out of subjective assessment of borrowers, which varies from 1 in case of perfect
flexibility and 5 in case of perfect inflexibility), and the default rate (PCDEF,
defaulted amount of loan as percentage of lender’s demand). Although a few other
dimensions could be added to the credit package, in view of the static nature of  the
underlying conceptual framework and also to simplify matters to some extent, those
attributes are treated as historically pre-determined. The list of such pre-determined
variables include whether or not a borrower has access to formal and informal credit
(FOR and NFOR, both of which are 0-1 type binary variables), number of years of
attachment of the borrower to formal and informal sources of credit (WEXP), whether
or not the borrower is able to offer a tangible item as collateral against loan (TANGI,
a 0-1 type binary variable), relative comfort level and relative recommendation index
of the borrower for formal source of loan (RCOM and RREM, respectively, which are
constructed as ratio between comfort/recommendation level for formal credit to the
same for informal credit)
5. As variables belonging to the above-stated last group are
treated as given in the present analysis, these are grouped as part of the given
characteristics of borrower households in Appendix 3, which provides minimum,
maximum as well as average values of the variables found relevant for the regression
analysis that follows.
The other characteristics of borrower villages and borrower households, which
are found to have some explanatory power, are also listed in Appendix 3. The relevant
village characteristics include: MICRO (whether or not micro-financing has made a
beginning in the borrower’s village), PCNBS (% of working population engaged in
non-farm business and services), MARKET, PUCCA, BUS and PANCH (distance in
kilometers of the village from nearest market, pucca road, bus route and Panchayat
office), PBOVINE (number of bovine population per head in the village), UCASTE
(% of upper caste population in the village), and MLIT (% male literacy of the
village). The household characteristics found relevant in regression analysis are:
                                                
5 As comfort/recommendation levels, based on borrower’s subjective notions, vary from 1 in case of
most satisfactory experiences and 5 in case of worst possible experiences, these ratios vary from 0.20 to12
HSIZE (household size), EXT (index of extension of borrower household), PCWORK
(% of working population in the household), PCCCLD (% of child labor in 6-12 age
group), PY (per head annual income in Rs.), PCTSR (% of household income from
trade and services), AREA (operational size of household’s agricultural land in
hectares), PCIR (% of irrigated land held by the household), PCCASH (% of gross
cropped area under cash crops), PVPROD (value of agricultural output per hectare in
Rs.), PCOUT (% of household loan adjusted against sale of borrower’s output),
PTINPUT (value of purchased inputs applied per hectare of agricultural land), DEPO
(whether or not the borrower has any savings deposit; 0 or1), EXTEN (whether the
borrower has access to local extension service; 0 or 1), INTAN (whether the borrower
is involved in any local level organization; 0 or 1), INTAN1 (the extent of borrower’s
involvement in local organizations; 0-6), FAM (household’s familiarity with
important local personalities; 0-5), PPROVI (per head annual expenditure of
household in Rs. on purchase of provisions), and LL, MG, and SM (0-1 type dummy
variables for landless, marginal farmer and small farmer households, respectively to
measure shift in intercept term of a regression relative to the same for the largest size
group of borrowers).
Table 3 attempts to explain four major quantitative attributes of loan –
TLOAN, PCFOR, PCCONS and GAP. Proximity of borrower’s village to Panchayat
office (PANCH), the grass root level political body in the Indian context, seem to be
boosting up the share of formal sector loan in the borrower’s portfolio, besides
bringing down the gap between borrower’s loan demand and loan supply to him. Both
these effects are found to be statistically significant, and given the fact that
Panchayats do have a say in the granting of loans, especially from the formal sector
credit institutions, this is quite expected. Proximity of borrower’s village to the market
place (MARKET) and bus route (BUS), too, as expected, has positive and significant
effects on total loan size (TLOAN). PUCCA, proximity of the borrower’s village to
pucca road (district/state highways) has, however, a dampening effect on the share of
formal credit (PCFOR), a strengthening effect on the gap between demand and supply
of credit (GAP), and a discouraging effect on the share of consumption loan
(PCCONS). This is plausible due to prevailing regulations on formal sector credit to
                                                                                                                                           
6. These ratios are looked upon as decided over long years of experience and hence treated as given for13
meet the credit needs of target groups of people in interior villages. The above-stated
discouraging effect on share of consumption loan may also be due to lesser
dependence on consumption loan of borrowers living in close proximity of pucca
road. Borrowers villages with larger potential for employment in non-farm business
and services (PCNBS) seem to have attracted a smaller size of loan on average
(TLOAN) and a smaller demand-supply gap in loan (GAP), but a larger share of
consumption loan (PCCONS). Villages with high incidence of upper caste population
(UCASTE), who are generally associated with greater economic affluence and
political clout, seem to have attracted a larger share of formal credit (PCFOR) and a
smaller share of consumption loan (PCCONS), as expected. Villages with higher male
literacy rates (MLIT) have however attracted a smaller share of consumption loan
(PCCONS).
Among the household attributes, a larger family size (HSIZE) is found to have
ended up with a larger demand-supply gap in loan (GAP). Households with a larger
percentage of working population (PCWORK), as typically found in poorer
households, are found to have enjoyed a smaller share of formal credit (PCFOR), but
a larger share of consumption loan (PCCONS). Borrowers with a larger size of
operational holding (AREA), those incurring higher expenditure on purchase of
agricultural inputs (PTINPUT) and those involved in local level organizations
(INTAN) have captured, as expected, a larger loan size (TLOAN). Borrowers with a
larger incidence of cash crops on their agricultural land (PCCASH) seem to have
ended up having a larger demand-supply gap in loan (GAP) and a larger share on
consumption loan (PCCONS). This is expected as putting more land on cash crops
tends to increase demand for loan proportionately more than increase in supply (due
to built-in inflexibility of stipulated scale of finance for crop loans), besides increasing
demand for consumption loans to meet consumption expenses before such crops are
marketed. While familiarity with important local personalities (FAM) is found to have
increased borrower’s share of formal credit, it has increased the gap between credit
demand and credit supply – apparently because FAM has increased credit demand
proportionately more than credit supply. The borrower family’s access to official
extension service channel (EXTEN) seem to have helped reduce demand-supply gap
                                                                                                                                           
purpose of present analysis.14
in credit (GAP) and increase the family’s share in consumption loan (PCCONS). As
expected, PCTSR, borrower families having a larger share of income from trade and
services (which is generally more stable as compared to agricultural income), are
found to have enjoyed a larger share of formal credit (PCFOR) and a larger share of
consumption credit (PCCONS), as compared to an average borrower. A longer period
of association with lending institutions (WEXP) has similarly contributed to achieving
a larger loan size (TLOAN) and a larger percentage of consumption loan (PCCONS).
Borrower families having comparatively larger (relative) comfort/recommendation
levels based on their past experiences for formal sources of credit (i.e., with lower
values of RCOM and RREM, as they are defined) have naturally got a larger share of
formal credit (PCFOR). While access to either source of credit (FOR and NFOR) has
positive effect on the total size of loan enjoyed by the borrower (TLOAN), it is
interesting to note that this impact coefficient is larger and statistically significant for
the informal source (NFOR), while it is smaller and far from statistically significant
for the formal source of credit (FOR).  Similarly, while access to both sources of
credit tends to increase share of consumption loan (PCCONS), the impact is larger
and statistically significant only for the informal source of credit. Exactly the opposite
is observed for these access variables with respect to demand-supply gap in loan – the
impact is negative, larger in absolute terms and statistically significant only in case of
access to formal source of credit. The dummy variables, LL, MG and SM, too,
provide interesting insights. Positive and significant coefficients for all these three
variables in the equation for total loan size (TLOAN) indicates that the intercept term
in total loan size equation shifts up for all these three size groups of borrowers, as
compared to the same for the largest size group. Coefficients for LL, MG and SM  are
all negative for the equation of  PCFOR, the share of formal credit, but it is
statistically significant only for LL. The same coefficients for the equation for GAP,
the demand-supply gap, are all positive, but none of them is statistically significant.
Thus, the share of formal credit, while it tends to be less for all three smaller
landholding groups of borrowers as compared to the largest group, it is significantly
only in case of landless borrowers. The demand-supply gap in credit, on the other
hand, has a tendency to be larger for all three smaller landholding groups (as
compared to the same for medium and large farmer households), but it is statistically
significant in none of the cases. These dummy variables have however all positive and
significant coefficients (as expected, this coefficient is much larger for the landless15
group as compared to the same for the other two groups) in the equation for
PCCONS, the share of consumption loans.
Table 3: OLS Regressions to explain Quantitative Attributes of Loan
TLOAN PCFOR PCCONS GAP
INTERCEPT -118570 (9.45)** 0.82 (15.71)** 1.50 (0.17) 18.41 (3.77)**
Village Attributes
PANCH - -0.04 (4.41)** - 2.45 (3.51)**
MARKET -1365.75 (2.20) - - -
PUCCA 0.037 (4.10)** 3.63 (4.02)** -1.046 (1.56)
BUS -2000.25 (1.41) - - -
PCNBS -697.33 (2.83)** - 0.97 (6.54)** -0.196 (2.77)**
UCASTE - 0.0012 (3.49)** -0.19 (3.26)** -
MLIT - - -0.15 (2.13)* -
Household Attributes
HSIZE - - 0.518 (2.01)*
PCWORK - -0.00091 (2.20)* 0.10 (1.81)* -
AREA 41812 (25.55)** -
PCCASH - - 0.070 (1.67)* 0.0676 (2.66)**
PTINPUT 0.10 (1.80)* - - -
INTAN 2401.99 (1.56) - - -
FAM - 0.027 (3.79)** - 1.80 (2.44)*
EXTEN - - 7.97 (2.52)* -5.556 (2.49)*
PCTSR - 0.000863 (2.77)** 0.08 (1.77)* -
WEXP 741.11 (2.70)** - 0.36 (2.15)* -
RCOM - -0.11 (9.97)** - -
RREM - -0.049 (4.08)** - -
FOR 10905 (1.44) - 4.21 (0.97) -5.725 (2.31)*
NFOR 13610 (2.58)** - 16.56 (5.58)** -2.55 (1.47)
LL 120109 (12.40)** -0.09 (3.08)** 36.33 (8.84)** 0.83 (0.34)
MG 92860 (11.37)** -0.04 (1.61) 7.79 (2.27)* 1.88 (0.93)
SM 64762 (8.60)** -0.017 (0.63) 7.97 (2.24)* 0.89 (0.43)
Loan Attributes
TLOAN - - - -0.000022 (2.44)*
INT 64.23(0.25) - - -
FORINT - 0.0067 (4.55)** - -
NFORINT - -0.0074 (13.10)** - -
PFORTC -89373 (2.47)* - - -
DY 22.45 (2.08)* - - -
UP -2484.85 (0.97) - - -
FLX - - - -1.69 (3.98)**
MONIT - - -17.88 (5.72)** -4.35 (2.44)*
ADJ R
2 0.61 0.64 0.39 0.12
F VALUE 57.52 80.34 25.24 5.99
Note: Coefficients with * and ** are significant at 1% and %% levels of significance, respectively, for
one-tailed t-test.
Though the intention of this paper is not to attempt simultaneous estimation of
all the terms and conditions of credit – at least at this preliminary stage of analysis of
the available dataset, an attempt is nevertheless made to include in single equation
OLS exercises various endogenous loan attributes as explanatory variables and thus to
get an idea about the interrelationships across various dimensions of the loan package.16
For example, total loan size (TLOAN) is found to have a negative and significant
effect on GAP, the demand-supply gap in loan. The overall interest rate (an weighted
average of interest rates observed in various segments of credit), INT, is found to have
a positive (but not significant) effect on total loan size, TLOAN. Formal sector
interest rate (FORINT) has a positive and informal sector interest rate (NFORINT) a
negative effect (and both significant) on share of formal sector credit (PCFOR). It
appears the supply side effects on PCFOR are more stable as compared to the demand
side effects in equilibrium. Moreover, the negative and significant sign of NFORINT
in the equation for PCFOR seems to signify complementary rather than competitive
relation between formal and informal - the two broad sources of credit. Percentage of
monetary transaction cost for formal source of credit (PFORTC) has a natural
negative and significant effect on the total size of loan (TLOAN), but overall non-
monetary transaction cost (DY) has a positive and significant association with the
same variable, TLOAN. Incidence of upfront interest payments (UP) has a
discouraging effect on loan size (TLOAN), but it is not statistically significant. When
more flexibility is imparted in loan repayments (i.e., the value of FLX falls), it tends
to significantly increase demand-supply gap (GAP) in credit. Greater incidence of
monitoring and counseling of loans by lender (MONIT) leads to significantly reduce
the extent of demand-supply gap (GAP) and incidence of consumption loans
(PCCONS).
Table 4 attempts to explain two different measures of overall transaction costs
– monetary transaction cost as percentage of total loan size, PTC, and number of
days’ gap between application and approval of loan, DY, which being the most
important determinant of the non-monetary efforts a potential borrower has to put in
order to get a loan, is looked upon as a good proxy measure of non-monetary
transaction costs. The location of the borrower’s village in a place where micro-
financing has made a beginning (MICRO) has a positive and significant effect on the
measure of non-monetary transaction costs (DY) for the simple reason that micro-
finance organizations generally follow a rigorous process of verification of the
borrower’s credentials between application for and approval of a loan. Proximity of
Panchayat  to borrower’s village (PANCH) or higher incidence of upper caste
population in borrower’s village (UCASTE) are found to pull down borrower’s17
monetary transaction costs (PTC) in a significant way. Among the various household
attributes, borrower’s household size (HSIZE), annual household expenditure on
purchase of provisions (PPROVI), incidence of use of tangible collateral (TANGI)
and access to formal source of credit (FOR) are found to have significant negative
Table 4: OLS Regressions to explain Borrower’s Monitoring and Non-
monitoring Transaction Costs
PTC DY
INTERCEPT 0.0068 (0.56) 21.38 (4.21)**
Village Attributes
MICRO - 7.11 (3.65)**
PANCH 0.00300 (2.38)* -
UCASTE -0.000094 (1.48) -
Household Attributes
HSIZE 0.0025 (3.56)** -
EXT - 2.21 (1.47)
PCIR - -0.09 (3.48)**
PCCASH -0.00023 (3.57)** -0.07 (2.01)*
PPROVI 0.0000011 (1.57) -
WEXP -0.001 (4.62)** -0.32 (2.50)*
TANGI 0.02 (3.46)** 14.28 (6.51)**
FOR 0.023 (3.73)** 6.82 (1.99)*
NFOR 0.019542 (4.28) -14.30 (6.61)**
LL -0.012 (1.94)* -12.10 (3.45)**
MG -0.0060 (1.15) -7.68 (2.84)**
SM -0.0050 (0.95) -8.76 (3.11)**
Loan Attributes
TLOAN -0.000000076 (3.20)** -
FLX -0.0041 (3.87)** -
MONIT -0.15 (3.41)** -
ADJ R
2 0.22 0.29
F VALUE 11.78 21.79
Note: Coefficients with * and ** are significant at 1% and %% levels of significance, respectively, for
one-tailed t-test.
impact on monetary transaction costs (PTC), whereas incidence of cash crops being
grown by the borrower household (PCCASH) and number of years’ association of
borrower family with credit institutions (WEXP) are observed to have significant
negative effects. Monetary transaction costs (PTC) seem to be smaller for households
with smaller rather than larger size of land holdings, but this effect is found to be
significant for only landless group of borrowers. Among the household attributes, a
larger order of extension of borrower household (EXT), a higher incidence of use of
tangible collateral (TANGI), and greater access to formal source of credit (FOR) seem
to have positive and significant impact on the measure of non-monetary transaction
costs (DY), whereas a higher incidence of irrigation on borrower’s agricultural land
(PCIR), a higher incidence of production of cash crops by the borrower’s household18
(PCCASH), a larger number of years’ association of borrower with credit institutions
(WEXP) and a greater access to informal source of credit (NFOR), too, have
significant but exactly the opposite effects. In the equation for non-monetary
transaction costs, DY, all the three size of holding dummies, LL, MG and SM have
significant and negative effects, thus meaning that these three smaller size group of
borrowers incur significantly lesser non-monetary transaction costs as compared to
their larger counterpart (and this is more so for the landless group of borrowers). None
of the endogenous loan attributes is found to have explanatory power for the
regression equation of DY, but this is not the case for the equation of  PTC. While
total loan size (TLOAN) and incidence of monitoring and counseling (MONIT) are
found to have significant negative effects on monetary transaction costs, PTC, greater
flexibility provided in loan repayment clauses  (i.e., a smaller value of FLX) is found
to have exactly the opposite effect.
Table 5 attempts to explain annual interest rates on loans, which are prevailing
in different segments of the credit market – namely, FORINT, NFORINT and INT (an
weighted average of the first two). While interpreting TFOR, the interest rate for the
formal sector, however, one has to keep in mind the effect of governmental interest
rate regulations undermining the working of market forces. Among the village
attributes, proximity to nearby market (i.e., a lower value of MARKET) has the effect
of significantly pulling down interest rate across the board, while villages with higher
male literacy rates (MLIT) – apparently through influencing the term structure in
favor of longer-duration loans - seem to have attracted statistically significant higher
interest rate on formal credit (FORINT). Villages with larger bovine stock per head
(PBOVINE) and a larger percentage of working population engaged in non-farm
business and services (PCNBS) seem to have confronted significantly lower overall
interest rate (INT).
Borrowers’ household attributes seem to be influencing the interest rates in the
following manner. Household size (HSIZE) has a positive and significant effect on
formal sector interest rate. PCCASH, incidence of cash crop on borrower’s
agricultural land, has significant negative effect on both informal (NFORINT) and
overall (INT) interest rates. Incidence of borrower’s loan being adjusted against
borrower’s sale of output to the lender (PCOUT) – a prominent feature of informal19
credit – has a significant negative effect on informal sector interest rate (NFORINT).
Percentage of borrower family income arising out of trade and services (PCTSR) has
significant and negative effect on both formal (FORINT) and overall (INT) interest
rates.  Borrower family’s access to official extension services (EXTEN) – probably
through its influence on size and term structure of loans - seems to have significantly
raised interest rates across the board (i.e., FORINT, NFORINT and INT). Apparently
for similar reason, incidence of deposit holding by borrower (DEPO) seems to have
significantly increased interest rate on formal credit (FORINT). Incidence of use of
tangible collateral by borrower household (TANGI) has for understandable reasons
significant negative effect on interest on formal credit (FORINT). While longer
duration of association between borrower and lending institution (WEXP) has a
negative and significant effect on formal sector interest rate (FORINT), the relation is
exactly the opposite in the informal credit sector (precisely, on NFORINT).
Borrowing household’s involvement in local level organizations (INTAN) –
apparently through its influence on size and term structure of loans) – seem to have
both positive and significant effects on informal (NFORINT) and overall (INT)
interest rates. While annual per capita family income (PY) has a negative and
significant effect on the interest rate on informal credit (NFORINT), incidence of
child labor in borrower household (PCCLD) has exactly the opposite effect on the
same variable.  While access to both formal and informal credit (FOR and NFOR)
tends to raise the overall interest rate on loan (INT), the effect is larger and
statistically significant only in case of informal sector loan. Compared to the largest
landholding group of borrowers, landless and marginal farmer households pay
significantly higher interest rate on formal credit (the additional interest payment is
again higher for landless group as compared to the case of marginal farmers), as
reflected in the coefficients of LL and MG in the equation for FORINT. Even though
SM too has a positive coefficient in the equation for FORINT, it is far from
statistically significant. The overall interest rate is however consistently and
significantly higher for the three groups of borrowers as compared to the case of the
largest size group of borrowers. While this interest rate is on average 4.11% higher for
the landless group, this difference is only 2.8% for marginal farmer group and 1.95%
for small farmers (see the coefficients of LL, MG and SM in the equation for INT).
Contrary to the common belief, interest rates are not significantly higher (as compared
to the same for medium and large farmers) in the informal credit market for the20
smaller landholding groups of farmers, nor is there any consistent hierarchy of interest
rates, as can be seen from a look at the coefficients of LL, MG and SM in the
regression equation for NFORINT.
Interrelationship across endogenous attributes of loan in the context of interest
rate estimation can be seen in the bottom panel of Table 5. Total loan (TLOAN) has a
positive but statistically insignificant effect on the overall interest rate, INT. Total
formal sector loan (TFOR) has a negative effect on formal sector interest rate
(FORINT), and total informal sector loan (TNFOR) has a positive effect on informal
interest rate (NFORINT), but neither of them is statistically significant. A higher
percentage of production loan, PCPROD (i.e., a lower percentage of consumption
loan, PCCONS) has a negative and significant effect on the overall interest rate (INT).
Less flexibility in loan repayment procedures (i.e., a higher value of FLX) is found to
have generated a lower interest rate on formal credit (FORINT). In the informal
market for credit, a greater incidence of upfront interest payment (UP), a larger
incidence of monitoring by lender (MONIT) and a higher default on loans (PCDEF)
are found to have led to a higher interest rate on informal credit (NFORINT).
We now turn to explain in Table 6 the other endogenous attributes of credit –
namely, whether interest is paid upfront (UP= 0 or 1), whether monitoring and
counseling of loans are done (MONIT= 0 or 1), the extent flexibility clauses are
permitted in loan repayment provisions (FLX= 1 to 5) and the percentage of default
on loans (PCDEF). To explain the first two attributes, single-equation logistic
regressions have been tried, whereas regular OLS regressions are tried to explain FLX
and PCDEF. It must be recalled that FLX varies from 1 to 5, with 1 in cases of perfect
flexibility and 5 in cases of perfect inflexibility in repayment provisions.
The village characteristics, which have been found relevant in this context, are
reported first. The incidence of upfront interest payments (UP=1) is found to be
significantly less in villages, where micro-finance has made its appearance
(MICRO=1). Proximity of borrower’s village to local Panchayat office (i.e., a smaller
value of PANCH) seems to have given a boost to the overall default rate (PCDEF),
which is also found to be a statistically significant result. Distance of the borrower’s
village from the nearest market place, MARKET seems to have encouraged incidence21
of upfront interest payment (UP), increased flexibility in loan repayments (i.e., a
smaller value of FLX) – apparently under government policy influence, and reduced
the default rate on loans (PCDEF).  Villages with higher incidence of upper caste
population (UCASTE) seem to have confronted a higher value of FLX – i.e., a lower
order of flexibility in loan repayment, but exactly the opposite seems to have
happened in villages with a higher percentage of male literacy rates (MLIT). Greater
bovine stock per head in borrower’s village (PBOVINE) has apparently increased the
risks involved in loaning and consequently increased the incidence of upfront loan
payments (UP) and loan monitoring (MONIT).
Table 5: OLS Regressions to explain Annual Interest Rates across Segments
FORINT NFORINT INT
INTERCEPT 5.56 (3.25)** 9.32 (2.30)* 11.64 (4.79)**
Village Attributes
MARKET 0.37 (3.88)** 1.00 (3.88)** 0.37 (3.02)**
PBOVINE - -1.83 (3.33)**
PCNBS - - -0.11 (2.88)**
MLIT 0.08 (6.52)** - -
Household Attributes
HSIZE 0.22 (2.40)* - -
PCCASH - -0.10 (2.85)** -0.04 (3.12)**
PCOUT - -0.0003 (2.76)**
PCTSR -0.03 (3.62)** - -0.04 (3.35)**
EXTEN 3.40 (5.07)** 5.08 (2.55)** 3.15 (3.32)**
DEPO 2.57 (3.69)** - -
TANGI -1.29 (2.28)* - -
WEXP -0.11 (3.32)** 0.27 (2.47)* -
INTAN - 4.24 (2.24)* 3.91 (4.84)**
PCCLD - 0.06 (2.90)** -
PY - -0.0002 (1.64) -
FOR - - 1.61 (1.18)
NFOR - - 4.88 (5.30)**
LL 3.09 (3.44)** -0.81 (0.27) 4.11 (2.89)**
MG 1.92 (2.67)** -1.75(0.64) 2.80(2.52)*
SM 0.22 (0.31) -3.43 (1.27) 1.95 (1.72)*
Loan Attributes
TLOAN - - 0.0000019 (0.39)
TFOR -0.0000020 (0.46) -
TNFOR - 0.000019 (0.83)
PCPROD - - -0.03 (2.24)*
FLX -0.72 (4.85)** -
UP - 14.74 (5.24)** -
MONIT - 5.12 (1.95)* -
PCDEF - 0.07 (5.24)** -
ADJ R
2 0.22 0.31 0.25
F VALUE 12.11 10.30 14.63
Note: Coefficients with * and ** are significant at 1% and %% levels of significance, respectively, for
one-tailed t-test.22
The household attributes of borrowers are found to have the following effects.
Household size (HSIZE) has significant and positive effect on percentage default
(PCDEF) and flexibility in loan repayment (i.e., a smaller value of FLX), and it also
significantly reduces the incidence of upfront interest payments (UP). Increase in size
of operational land holding (AREA) significantly increases the incidence of
monitoring and counseling of loan (MONIT) and decreases the extent of loan default,
PCDEF (though not statistically significantly). Availability of greater irrigation
facilities on borrower’s land (PCIR) also significantly increases the incidence of loan
monitoring (MONIT).  Both greater incidence of cash crops on borrower’s land
(PCCASH) as well as greater borrower’s access to official extension service channel
(EXTEN) reduce the extent of loan default (PCDEF), but whereas the former
significantly increase flexibility in loan repayment (i.e., produces a lower value of
FLX), the latter does exactly the opposite – that is, borrowers enjoying government
extension services confront lesser flexibility in loan repayment. Farmers with higher
values of crop output per hectare (PVPROD) and with greater familiarity at local
bureaucracy (FAM) enjoy greater flexibility in loan repayment (i.e., have lower
values of FLX). Such familiarity index (FAM) also significantly reduces the incidence
of upfront interest payments (UP) and monitoring of loans (MONIT). Longer
association with credit institutions (WEXP) and breadth of involvement in local level
organizations (INTAN1) have opposing effects on loan default rate (PCDEF) – while
the former reduces the default rate (and significantly so), the latter raises it (though
not statistically significantly). TANGI, capturing incidence of use of tangible
collateral is found to be associated with lower incidence of upfront interest payments
(UP), but lesser flexibility in loan repayments (i.e., a higher value of FLX) and a
higher rate of loan default (PCDEF). Access to both sources of credit (i.e., FOR and
NFOR) significantly reduces incidence of upfront interest payments (UP) and loan
monitoring (MONIT). However, the reduction in values of both UP and MONIT is
much higher for borrowers of formal rather than informal credit.  Access to formal
credit (FOR) reduces flexibility in loan repayment, whereas access to informal credit
does exactly the opposite. Access to both sources has a tendency to raise the default
rate, but this impact is statistically significant only for borrowers of informal loan. As
coefficients of LL, MG and SM are all negative but far from statistically significant in
the logistic regression for UP, one cannot claim that the incidence of upfront interest
payments is consistently higher or lower for the smaller size groups of borrowers (as23
Table 6: Regressions to explain Incidence of upfront Interest Payment (UP),
Provision of Monitoring /Extension Service on Loan (MONIT), Extent of Flexibility
permitted in Loan Repayment (FLX) and Percentage of Loan Default (PCDEF)
UP MONIT FLX PCDEF
INTERCEPT - 4.74 (10.56)** -
Village Attributes
MICRO -0.75 (8.93)** - - -
PANCH - - - -1.02 (1.34)
MARKET 0.17 (18.34)** - -0.11 (-4.34)** -1.42 (4.07)**
UCASTE - - 0.0114 (3.82)** -
MLIT - - -0.0093 (2.48)** -
PBOVINE 0.87 (12.64)** 0.34 (7.19)** - -
Household Attributes
HSIZE -0.10 (5.03)* - -0.08 (3.26)** 2.00 (5.04)**
AREA - 0.36 (9.93)** - -1.38 (1.21)
PCIR - 0.0079 (12.23)** - -
PCCASH - - -0.01 (3.99)** -0.15 (3.80)**
PVPROD - - -0.0000025 (2.04)* -
EXTEN - - 0.41 (1.82)* -5.42 (2.06)*
FAM -0.26 (7.63)** -0.19 (8.86)** -0.25 (3.45)** -
WEXP - - - -0.53 (4.10)**
INTAN1 - - - 1.16 (1.60)
TANGI -0.68 (5.62)* - 0.27 (1.71)* 5.50 (2.26)*
FOR -3.73 (31.54)** -2.13 (41.80)** 0.63 (2.60)** 1.80 (0.50)
NFOR -2.24 (50.56)** -1.40 (45.40)** -1.11 (6.91)** 11.61 (4.42)**
LL -0.55 (1.48) 1.78 (12.03)** -0.02 (0.10) -9.23 (1.71)*
MG -0.32 (0.66) 0.73 (3.17) -0.38 (2.01)* -4.30 (1.01)
SM -0.06 (0.02) 0.92 (7.38)** 0.01 (0.08) -1.60 (0.43)
Loan Attributes
TLOAN 0.000018 (5.69)* - - -0.00000 (0.34)
PCCONS - - - 0.14 (4.20)**
MONIT - - - -8.74 (3.28)**
Up - - - 7.59 (2.16)*
FLX - - - -2.89 (4.34)**
INT -0.11 (56.17)** -0.032 (11.98)** - -
PCDEF - 0.02 (24.94)** - -
ADJ R
2 - - 0.30 0.32
F VALUE /
-2 Log L
1176.79 2084.91 16.96 15.34
Note: Coefficients with * and ** are significant at 1% and %% levels of significance, respectively, for
one-tailed t-test.
compared to the same for medium and large farmers). The incidence of loan
monitoring is consistently and significantly higher for borrowers with smaller land
holding size (as compared to the same for medium and large farmers), and other
things remaining the same, it is the highest with the landless group, as it can be seen
from the sign and size of coefficients of LL, MG and SM in the regression equation
for MONIT.  Only the marginal farmer group of borrowers enjoys (as compared to the
largest group, which acts as the reference point for comparison) significantly greater
flexibility in loan repayment (as only MG has statistically significant coefficient in the24
regression equation for FLX). Similarly, only the landless group of borrowers has
comparatively and statistically significantly lower default rate (as reflected by the
only statistically significant coefficient of LL in the regression equation for PCDEF).
The various endogenous attributes of loan have the following impact on the
four explained variables – UP, MONIT, FLX and PCDEF. TLOAN, the total loan size
has a positive and significant effect on the incidence of upfront interest payments
(UP), but negative and statistically insignificant effect on loan default rate, PCDEF.
PCCONS, percentage of consumption loan has positive and statistically significant
effect on loan default rate (PCDEF). Higher overall interest rate on loan, INT seems
to have contributed to a lower (and significantly so) incidence of upfront interest
payments (UP) and loan monitoring (MONIT). While incidence of upfront interest
payments, UP has a positive and significant effect on loan default rate, PCDEF,
exactly the opposite is the effect of monitoring variable, MONIT on PCDEF.
Imparting greater flexibility in loan repayments (i.e., a lower value of FLX) seems to
have an encouraging effect (and significantly so) on loan default rate, PCDEF.
Section 5: Concluding Observations
Credit, being a complex multidimensional package of services, demands a
systems approach backed by an excellent two-sided dataset (i.e., capturing both
borrower and lender side information) for perfect understanding and full-fledged
analysis. Although there are limitations of both theory and data at this stage, the paper
has nevertheless made a modest attempt to move in that direction. The beauty of
institutional economics is that it is capable of providing a fairly exhaustive view of the
underlying problems of credit and a comprehensive framework to explain the broad
trends in the market for credit in the Indian context – namely, why the desired
quantitative attributes of credit are suffering, while the price of credit has continued to
be very high and almost out of line with the same in most developed countries.
However, the conceptual framework confronts a limitation, as it is incapable of
producing clear and sharp hypotheses for testing against ex post facto data. Similarly,
while the dataset used in this paper is fairly large in terms of sample size and coverage
of borrower side information, it lacks enough lender side data for full-fledged25
application of the teachings of institutional economics.
6 However, in spite of these
limitations, the used dataset and the underlying theory are good enough to attempt to
understand variation in the credit package available to different groups of borrowers
and thus to examine the popular allegation of discrimination in terms of credit
availability against rural borrowers of smaller means (i.e., against landless and small
farmer households).
The major findings of this paper can be summed up as follows;
•  As the lender can easily and closely observe most of the attributes of a
borrower and his village, he can achieve minute modifications of the credit
package to suit his as well as the borrower’s interests. Thus, the credit package
tens to be virtually unique to each pair of borrower and lender, varying across
multifarious attributes of their households. This is especially true for informal
credit, which continues to escape various government regulations and
stipulations for all practical purposes.
•  While government policy has been attempting to control the number, size and
composition of formal credit to target groups in rural communities with only a
limited access, there are many other dimensions of a credit package, which
remain outside of government control, but are quite relevant to the borrower.
Given the high cost and even futility (for the reasons mentioned herein) of
government control, the government might as well think in terms of further
decontrol and competition in delivery of credit.
•  Contrary to the official line of thinking, informal credit continues to play a
major and useful role in meeting the credit needs of not only poorer
households, but also richer households. So, the sooner the government realizes
the complementary role of informal credit and allows its open and competitive
functioning, the better.
•  Not only economic variables, but also socio-political factors act as crucial
determinants of the various dimensions of credit. This is especially true of the
apparently invisible role of Panchayats and other local level organizations. It
is necessary to streamline the role of these organizations in the context to
minimize possible damages, especially through high default rates.
                                                
6 More precisely, it lacks data to study the possible implications of adverse selection and moral hazard26
As mentioned at the outset, this is only a modest attempt based on a rather
preliminary analysis of the available dataset. Naturally, finer refinements are
called for through simultaneous (rather than single-equation) analysis of the
endogenous attributes of credit. Given a fairly large size data, it might be possible
to go in for estimation of separate systems of equations to characterize credit for
different groups of borrowers, for different sources and even for different
purposes. Last but not the least,  more comprehensive data inclusive of lender side
information is needed in the future for a full-fledged analysis and understanding of
credit.
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of lenders, which might be quite widespread in the developing economies like India.27
Appendix 1: Average Characteristics of Borrower Households Classified by Nature of Household
Access to the Market for Credit
Households with/without
positive loan amount
Variables Yes (n=570) No (n=130)
a. Village characteristics
a.1 % residence of borrower in micro-finance villages (MICRO) 48.2 38.5**
a.2 % of borrower households engaged in non-farm, business & service
(PCNBS)
19.58 19.44
a.3 Distance in kms of nearest market from borrower’s village (MARKET) 2.43 0.21
a.4 Distance in kms of pucca road from borrower’s village (PUCCA) 0.64 2.85**
a.5 Distance in kms of bus route from borrower’s village (BUS) 1.00 2.94**
a.6 Distance in kms of Panchayat from borrower’s village (PANCH) 0.66 1.71**
a.7 No. of formal credit sources in borrower’s village (CINST) 2.26 1.64**
a.8 Bovine animals per head in borrower’s village (PBOVINE) 0.57 0.44**
a.9 % of households belonging to upper caste in borrower’s village
(UCASTE)
40.15 25.19**
a.10 % male literacy rate in borrower’s village (MLIT) 56.71 46.39**
b. Household education and demographic characteristics
b.1 Maximum level of male education  (MEDU) 2.72 2.26**
b.2 Maximum level of female education (FEDU) 2.10 1.98
b.3 Nature of household extension (EXT) 1.45 1.34*
b.4 Household size in numbers (HSIZE) 5.91 6.29
b.5 % of actual working population (PCWORK) 73.20 71.89
b.6  % of children within 6-12 age group going to work  (PCCLD) 21.80 19.88
c. Agricultural production characteristics
c.1 Operational land area in ha (AREA) 1.51 1.26
c.2  % irrigated area  (PCIR) 41.23 21.41**
c.3 Cropping intensity  (in %) (CROPINT) 159.27 138.23**
c.4  % of GCA devoted to cash crops  (PCCASH) 19.04 4.66**
c.5 Nature of ownership of landed  property  (SOWN) 1.40 1.75**
c.6 Nature of  ownership of modern agricultural implements (MODO) 0.79 0.58**
c.7 Nature of  ownership of irrigation equipments  (IRRO) 0.78 0.42**
c.8 Nature of  ownership of transportation equipments (TRANS) 0.93 0.58**
c.9 Annual expenditure in Rs. on purchased inputs per ha. of GCA
(PTINPUT)
6398 3365*
c.10 Value of all produce in Rs. /ha of operational land (PVPROD) 20172 9428**
c.11 Value of produce in Rs./ha. of GCA  (PVPROD1) 15559 6948**
c.12  % of credit adjusted against sale value of output (PCOUT) 9.36 23.03*
d. Household asset holding status
d.1 Index  of luxury items used (LUX) 0.46 0.41
d.2 Index of deposit holding with Post Office/Banks/Coops/NBFCs/Chit funds/
SHGs (DEPO)
0.79 0.50**
d.3 Index of familiarity with gramsevak/extension officer (EXTEN 0.76 0.68*
d.4 No. of milch animals per head (PMILK) 0.38 0.34
d.5 No. of goats, sheep, pigs & poultry birds per head  (PMEAT) 0.38 0.22*
d.6 Index of ownership of intangible assets  (INTAN) 0.62 0.48**
d.7 Extent of ownership of intangible assets (INTAN1) 1.52 0.86**
d.8 Extent of familiarity with important village personnel (FAM) 3.44 3.12**
d.9 Per head annual expenses on  provisions in Rs. (PPROVI) 3590 2655**
e. Household income
e.1 Annual per head income in Rs. (PY) 7920 6124*
e.2  % of income from trade & services (PCTSR) 22.10 22.9628
Appendix 2: Average Characteristics of Borrower Households classified by Nature of Household
Access to Formal Sector Credit
Households with positive
loan amount from formal
sector
Variables Yes (n=505) No (n=65)
a. village characteristics
a.1 % residence of borrower in micro-finance villages (MICRO) 0.50 0.34**
a.2 % of borrower households engaged in non-farm, business & services
(PCNBS)
19.69 18.75
a.3 Distance in kms of nearest market from borrower’s village (MARKET) 2.44 2.32
a.4 Distance in kms of pucca road from borrower’s village (PUCCA) 0.64 0.71
a.5 Distance in kms of bus route from borrower’s village (BUS) 0.98 1.09
a.6 Distance in kms of Panchayet from borrower’s village (PANCH) 0.64 0.86
a.7 No. of formal credit sources in borrower’s village (CINST) 2.24 2.38
a.8 Bovine animals per head in borrower’s village (PBOVINE) 0.60 0.34**
a.9 % of households belonging to upper caste in borrower’s village  UCASTE) 41.87 26.85**
a.10 % male literacy rate in borrower’s village (MLIT) 57.68 49.14**
b. Household education and demographic characteristics
b.1 Maximum level of male education  (MEDU) 2.81 1.98**
b.2 Maximum level of female education (FEDU) 2.17 1.55**
b.3 Index  of household extension (EXT) 1.49 1.14**
b.4 Household size in numbers (HSIZE) 6.12 4.32**
b.5 % of actual working population (PCWORK) 72.58 78.00
b.6  % of children within 6-12 age group going to work  (PCCLD) 23.07 11.92**
c. Agricultural production characteristics
c.1 operational land area in ha (AREA) 1.64 0.49**
c.2  % irrigated area  (PCIR) 45.22 10.15**
c.3 Cropping intensity (in %) (CROPINT) 1.35 0.55**
c.4  % of GCA devoted to cash crops  (PCCASH) 19.56 15.02
c.5 Nature of ownership of landed  property  (SOWN) 1.40 1.44
c.6 Nature of  ownership of modern agricultural implements (MODO) 0.85 0.31**
c.7 Nature of  ownership of irrigation equipments  (IRRO) 0.83 0.35**
c.8 Nature of  ownership of transportation equipments (TRANS) 0.98 0.51**
c.9 Annual expenditure in Rs. on purchased inputs per ha. of GCA  PTINPUT) 6932.69 2242.42*
c.10 Value of all produce in Rs. /ha of operational land (PVPROD) 21848.92 7146.20**
c.11 Value of produce in Rs./ha. of GCA  (PVPROD1) 16945.61 4789.18*
c.12  % of credit adjusted against sale value of output (PCOUT) 95.00 83.12
d. Household asset holding status
d.1 Index  of luxury items used (LUX) 0.49 0.20**
d.2 Index of energy used (ENERG) 0.74 0.55**
d.3 Index of deposit holding with Post Office/Banks/Coops/NBFCs/Chit funds/
SHGs (DEPO)
0.84 0.41**
d.4 Index of familiarity with gramsevak/extension officer (EXTEN) 0.78 0.78**
d.5 No. of milch animals per head (PMILK) 0.39 0.33
d.6 No. of goats, sheep, pigs & poultry birds per head  (PMEAT) 0.41 0.19*
d.7 Index of ownership of intangible assets  (INTAN) 0.64 0.46**
d.8 Extent of ownership of intangible assets (INTAN1) 1.61 0.78**
d.9Extent of familiarity with important village personnel(FAM) 3.55 2.52**
d.10Per head annual provisional expenses in Rs. (PPROVI) 3631.90 3260.73
e. Household income
e.1 Annual per head income in Rs. (PY) 8385.87 4300.56**
e.2  % of income from trade & services (PCTSR) 20.50 8.79**
f. Loan characteristics
f.1 Total Loan in Rs. (TLOAN) 29756.84 6587. 34**
f.2 Total loan in Rs. from informal sources (TNFOR) 7728.79 6587.3429
f.3 % of consumption loan (PCCONS) 41.38 64.79**
f.4 % of gap between demand & supply of loan (GAP) 8.00 14.16*
f.5 Explicit annual rate of interest (INT) 16.75 19.58*
F.6 Borrower’s transaction cost per Rs of loan (PTC) 0.02 0.01**
F.7 No. of days between application & approval of loan (DY) 19.21 0.55**
F.8 Nature of interest collection (upfront=1, later=0) (UP) 0.16 0.17
F.9 Index of flexibility in repayment of loan (FLX) (1= very high, 5=not) 3.32 2.42**
F.10 Monitoring & extension services on loan (MONIT) (1= yes, 0= no) 0.40 0.18**
F.11 % of default rate on loan (PCDEF) 17.23 23.14*
F.12 Years of  experience with lenders  (WEXP) 9.38 9.09
F.13 Use of tangible collaterals (1=yes, 0=no) (TANGI) 0.46 0.23**
F.14 Index of relative comfort level with formal lenders (RCOM) 0.47 3.01**
F.15 Index of relative recommendation index for formal  (RREM) 0.54 2.83**
Note for Appendices 1 & 2 : ** and * stand for cases where mean differences are statistically
significant under one-tailed t-test at 5 % & 10 % levels of significance, respectively. MEDU and FEDU
vary within [1-6] with 1= illiterate, 2= literate, 3= SSC, 4= diploma, 5= graduate, 6= post- graduate.
EXT varies from 1 to 4, a higher value meaning  a higher order of household extension. SOWN is 0 if
no property is owned, 1 if property is owned jointly and 2 if property is individually owned, a higher
value meaning a larger order of individualistic ownership of property. Similarly, MODO and IRRO
vary from 0 to 2, a higher value indicating a higher order of ownership (here a value of 1 means only
hired equipments) of costly agricultural equipments like power tiller, tractor and thresher and
irrigation equipment like pump set, respectively. INTAN & EXTEN vary from 0 to 1, indicating the
nature of access to local level organizations and to local extension facilities, respectively. INTAN1 and
FAM vary from 0 to 6 and 0 to 5, respectively indicating the breath of connections to local level
economic/social/political organization and familiarities to important local personnel.  LUX, ENERG,
and DEPO - each one of them varies from 0 to 1 to indicate absence or presence of  luxury items
electrical connections and  deposits,  respectively. RCOM and RREM are comfort and recommendation
indices (5=poorest, 1= highest) for formal sector relative to the same for the informal sector. They
vary from 0.20 to 5.030
Appendix 3: Summary Statistics on Variables used in Regression Analysis (n=570)
MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN
Village Attributes
MICRO 0.00 1.00 0.48
PCNBS 4.74 49.16 19.58
MARKET 0.00 14.00 2.43
PUCCA 0.00 12.00 0.64
BUS 0.00 12.00 1.00
PANCH 0.00 9.00 0.66
PBOVINE 0.02 3.33 0.57
UCASTE 0.00 93.53 40.15
MLIT 0.00 96.60 56.71
Household Attributes
HSIZE 1.00 24.00 5.91
EXT 1.00 4.00 1.45
PCWORK 0.00 100.00 73.20
PCCLD 0.00 100.00 21.80
PY 21 118582 7920
PCTSR 0.00 100.00 19.16
AREA 0.00 26.00 1.51
PCIR 0.00 100.00 41.23
PCCASH 0.00 100.00 19.04
PVPROD 0.00 1257391 20172
PCOUT 0.00 100.00 15.67
PTINPUT 0.00 860191 6398
DEPO 0.00 1.00 0.79
EXTEN 0.00 1.00 0.76
INTAN 0.00 1.00 0.62
INTAN1 0.00 6.00 1.52
FAM 0.00 5.00 3.44
PPROVI 0.00 32500 3590
FOR 0.00 1.00 0.89
NFOR 0.00 1.00 0.54
WEXP 0.00 50.00 9.35
RCOM 0.20 5.00 0.76
RREM 0.20 5.00 0.81
TANGI 0.00 1.00 0.43
LL 0.00 1.00 0.21
MG 0.00 1.00 0.32
SM 0.00 1.00 0.25
Loan Attributes
TLOAN 200 11,80,000 27115
TFOR 0.00 8,80,000 19516.08
TNFOR 0.00 420000 7599
PCFOR 0.00 100.00 72.00
PCPROD 0.00 100.00 55.95
PCCONS 0.00 100.00 44.05
GAP 0.00 100.00 8.70
INT 0.00 60.00 17.07
FORINT (n=505) 0.00 36.00 12.42
NFORINT (n=310) 0.00 70.00 14.38
PTC 0.00 0.45 0.02
DY 0.00 269.24 17.08
FLX 1.00 5.00 3.22
MONIT 0.00 1.00 0.38
UP 0.00 1.00 0.16
PCDEF 0.00 100.00 17.96